**THE CORRESPONDENCE OF METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE**

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The problem of correlation Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics can be resolve by three ways: (1) either metaphysics affects to ethics, (2) either ethics affects to metaphysics, (3) metaphysics and ethics affect each other. (It is possible that there is a fourth option, namely some discipline (logic, for example, or biology) is the basis for both metaphysics and ethics. However, this attitude is beyond the borders of our topic). In this report I will focus on the first two ways and offer a number of commentaries. The supporters of the first approach (T. Irwin [4], E. Halper [3], D. Achtenberg [1]) believe that in Aristotle’s metaphysics there are concepts and postulates that influenced to his practical philosophy. These researchers mostly believe that the crucial role in this influence was played by the concept of «essence» (*ousia*). For example, T. Irwin argues that the Nicomachean Ethics begins from two surprising theses (about *eidaimonia* and *ergon*) that could not be justified by ethics and required additional justification within the framework of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Psychology. And the concept of essence occupies an important place in this justification because the implementation of a human being’s “function” (*ergon*) is equal to realization of her essence. Meanwhile human happiness coincides with realization of her function. Thus, an essence and a happiness is the same things. In other words when a human being is happy his essence is mostly revealed. As I suppose this approach has one defect, namely it cannot represent Aristotle’s ethics in its completeness because it does not take into account deontological line. This line is manifested in EN 1144a19–20: “there is a state of mind in which a man may do these various acts with the result that he really is a good man: I mean when he does them from choice, and for the sake of the acts themselves” [2]. It is obvious that the commission of acts for their own sake as a condition of human morality is nothing but a marker for deontology. There are doubts that this deontological view can be fully reflected in the essential reading of Aristotle’s ethics. As an alternative to the essential reading, I propose an energeian reading, that is, instead of “essence/*ousia*” as the basis of Aristotle’s ethics, I suggest the concept of “actuality/*energeia*”. Since these notions partly coincident, it is rather extending of essential approach up to energeian approach than opposing of them.

Now let me turn to a second way on which Aristotle’s ethics regards as a basis for his metaphysics. Some researchers on this way try to use a notion of ‘*phronesis*’, while others appeal to ‘*prohairesis’*. For example, C.P. Long argues that the “the ontological conception of *praxis* developed in the middle books of the *Metaphysics* points already to the *Nicomachean Ethics* where a conception of knowledge – *phronêsis –* is developed that is capable of addressing the lacuna in the account of ontological knowledge offered in the *Metaphysics*” [5. P. 121]. Therefore, some ethical postulate helped Aristotle to make a response to the universal/singular *aporia* announced in *Met*. III. Without entering into a polemic with this decision, I would like to propose my own solution to this problem. According to my point, Aristotle’s views on the essence of human activity partly predetermined his ontological picture. The crucial role in this was played by Aristotle’s position in ethics and psychology that a human being acts voluntarily (*hekousion*) and by his/her own choice (*kata prohairesin*). This view led to the fact that Aristotle needed to introduce an additional sphere of being, along with what happens necessarily and what happens by chance. “Of the products of man’s intelligence some are never due to chance or necessity but always to an end” (Trans. by G. R. G. Mure) (*An. Post*. II 11). So, there is a region that depends on the person. In fact, man has become the creator of being. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Prime Mover of Aristotle is also a metaphysical concept influenced by his ethical attitudes. According to Aristotle, the object of human actions is *some* (apparent) good, while the Prime Mover is the real (truly) good. It is debatable which of these was primary: that any action, pursuit and choice aim at some good or that everything in the world is moving by a good mover, but I believe that if Aristotle’s view of human activity were otherwise, then the concept of the unmoved mover would be different.

I would like to finish my article by addressing the question: can Aristotle’s ethics be the first philosophy? I believe that Aristotle’s ethics should meet three criteria in order to be the first philosophy. Ethics (1) has to deal with the first principles and causes, (2) to give the universal knowledge and (3) to be valued above other disciplines. Although ethics really deals with principles (See: EN 1102a2–3, EN 1140b16–20), these principles are not *first*. As for the second criterion, Aristotle’s ethics also does not meet him as the first. In *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle claims that he are seeking a highest human good and one might expect that this good was assigned for *all* human beings. In fact, “the views of Aristotle on ethics represent, in the main, the prevailing opinions of educated and experienced men of his day” [6. P. 172]. Finally, let us discus the last criterion that implies that ethics has to have the highest value to be the first philosophy. However, as Aristotle claims “man is not the highest thing (μὴ τὸ ἄριστον) in the world” (EN 1141a23), the ethics cannot be the first philosophy. Therefore, ethics does not fully meet any of these criteria. At the same time, it is possible that the inquiry was more successful if we understood by ethics only the part that concerns the dianoetic virtues.

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